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Abstract
Most people believe in free will. Whether this belief is warranted or not, free will beliefs
(FWB) are foundational for many legal systems and reducing FWB has effects on behavior
from the motor to the social level. This raises the important question as to which specific
FWB people hold. There are many different ways to conceptualize free will, and some might
see physical determinism as a threat that might reduce FWB, while others might not. Here,
we investigate lay FWB in a large, representative, replicated online survey study in the US
and Singapore (n = 1800), assessing differences in FWB with unprecedented depth within
and between cultures. Specifically, we assess the relation of FWB, as measured using the
Free Will Inventory, to determinism, dualism and related concepts like libertarianism and
compatibilism. We find that libertarian, compatibilist, and dualist, intuitions were related to
FWB, but that these intuitions were often logically inconsistent. Importantly, direct compari-
sons suggest that dualism was more predictive of FWB than other intuitions. Thus, believing
in free will goes hand-in-hand with a belief in a non-physical mind. Highlighting the impor-
tance of dualism for FWB impacts academic debates on free will, which currently largely
focus on its relation to determinism. Our findings also shed light on how recent (neuro)scien-
tific findings might impact FWB. Demonstrating physical determinism in the brain need not
have a strong impact on FWB, due to a wide-spread belief in dualism.
Introduction
For centuries scholars have been debating whether humans have free will or not. But indepen-
dent of this academic, philosophical debate, most laypeople maintain a strong belief in free will
[1–3]. Many claim that this is socially desirable because the less people believe in free will the
more they are prone to aggression [4] and such beliefs are fundamental to much of our
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behavior [5]. Others highlighted possible pro-social effects of reduced FWB [6]. Importantly,
free will beliefs (FWB) are intimately linked to our sense of responsibility and are a foundation
for many criminal justice systems [7]. If FWB changed in the general public, this could poten-
tially also change e.g. our sense of responsibility in un-intuitive ways. According to some, such
changes might be triggered by recent neuroscientific findings [8,9]. Based on the idea of physi-
cal determinism, i.e. that all physical events are inevitably caused by prior physical events, such
studies often assess whether or how behavior is caused by a prior neural event. Some take this
as dis-proving free will [10,11], although this notion remains contested [12]. Despite this ongo-
ing debate, neuroscientific findings are already being used as an argument for reduced respon-
sibility in some criminal cases [7,13].
Academic and lay theories of free will
It thus seems that FWB might change over time, with potential broader effects on behavior.
However, in order to assess just how FWB might change, we first need to understand which
specific FWB people hold in the first place. In the philosophical, academic debate, at least three
broadly different theories have been put forward to support FWB. First, one might believe that
free will is the ability to do otherwise even if two choice situations were identical. This notion
is incompatible with physical determinism, which in turn is often rejected to make space for
free will (libertarianism, which is a prominent incompatibilist position [14]). Second, one
might believe that free will is the ability to act according to (or suppress) one’s drives and
desires, and/or not being coerced by external forces. This notion is compatible with determin-
ism (compatibilism, [3,12]). In this case, showing how our behavior is physically determined
poses no threat to free will. Third, one might believe that the mind or soul is not a physical
entity (dualism, [15]), which potentially also removes potential threats to free will. These posi-
tions have been clearly defined in the academic debate, and arguments for and against them
are well known [12]. Here, we only present the core beliefs of each theory. In fact, there exist
many versions of each of the three main positions, which are described in much more detail
elsewhere [11,12,14]. Recently, there has also been growing interest in lay theories of free will
and related intuitions in the general public [16,17], with much research revolving around the
question whether laypeople are intuitive compatibilists or incompatibilists [18,19]. This work
thus revolved around the relation of free will and determinism, and results have often been
inconclusive as lay theories often are inconsistent [19]. Agreeing with e.g. libertarian stances
on free will does not necessarily mean one would act in accordance with this view, and one
goal of this study was to measure both agreement to explicit theoretical statements as well as
behavior following from these stances (for some initial evidence see [1]).
One factor that received relatively less attention in the past is the relation of free will to
dualism. One recent empirical investigation assessed the relationship of different forms of
dualism and free will beliefs [20]. The authors found substance dualism (i.e. the mental and
the physical are separate, independent substances) to be more strongly related to free will
beliefs than reductive physicalism (i.e. there is only physical matter, making all mental states
physical), both of which are different views on mind-body dualism. They did not however dif-
ferentiate between different views on the relation of free will and determinism (e.g. compatibi-
lism, libertarianism). Here, we aim to compare the link of FWB to both determinism and
dualism simultaneously, assessing which theory best explains lay beliefs. Additionally, previous
work on this issue was performed mostly on US undergraduate samples (e.g. [21,22]), and it
thus remains unclear whether results are truly representative of lay beliefs in the general public.
Investigating lay theories in more representative samples has received little attention in the
past. If lay beliefs are to inform academic debates on free will, which has been argued for in the
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past [15,23], these lay beliefs need to be investigated in large, representative samples however.
In sum, while the academic debate largely revolves around reconciling the seemingly contra-
dictory notions of free will and determinism, whether determinism indeed challenges free will
in the eyes of the general public remains unclear. Here, our main goal was to determine
whether FWB are best explained by compatibilist, libertarian, or dualist intuitions in the gen-
eral public.
The present investigation
Here, we present data addressing this issue directly. In an online survey study, we acquired
data from n = 900 subjects in the United States (US), and n = 900 subjects in Singapore (SGP),
drawn representatively for sex and age. It has been suggested before that many findings in psy-
chological research lack generalizability because of selective and biased sampling procedures
[24], which is especially true for empirical research on free will [25,26]. In contrast to most pre-
vious research, our samples are representative for each of the two cultures tested, and we
included one western culture, which is regarded as individualist, and one east Asian culture,
typically taken to be collectivist [27]. Previous research demonstrated that locus of control is
less external in individualistic countries, as compared to collectivistic countries [28,29], and
FWB are in turn correlated with locus of control ([2], and also S1 Analysis). We thus initially
hypothesized that FWB might be stronger in the US than in SGP. Additionally, we might
expect a higher prevalence of libertarian views in the US, as generally individualistic partici-
pants might be more strongly opposed to their behavior being determined by external forces
(i.e. physical determinism). FWB were measured using the Free Will Inventory [1], which sep-
arately measures people’s free will beliefs along three dimensions: general free will (FW-gen-
eral, “Do we have free will or not?”), determinism (FW-de, “Is the world determined by prior
events or not?”), and dualism (FW-du, “Is the mind a non-physical entity or not?”). We then
assessed the relationship of general free will beliefs to determinism beliefs, hypothesizing that
they are related to determinism beliefs based on prominent positions in the philosophical dis-
course (e.g. compatibilism). We also assessed the relationship of general free will beliefs to
dualism, an issue that received increased attention recently [20]. We had no strong a priori
hypotheses regarding the relation of free will and dualism. To our knowledge this is the largest
in-depth analysis of FWB to date (see [27] for preliminary evidence).
Materials and methods
Participants
We acquired data from 900 subjects in the US (age between 18 and 64, mean age = 41.1, 459
females, 441 males, see Table 1 for full sample characteristics, n(intended) = 900, n(achieved)
= 900). We further acquired 900 subjects in Singapore (SGP, age between 18 and 64, mean age
38.9, 450 females, 450 males, n(intended) = 900, n(achieved) = 900). Both samples are repre-
sentative with respect to sex, which was the main reason for using this large sample size. Age
was binned into five different age groups (18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64), and the US
sample is fully representative with respect to age. In the SGP sample, we were unable to recruit
the necessary number of participants in the oldest age group (55–64, see Table 1), and the age
distribution is thus slightly skewed towards younger subjects. This deviation is very small how-
ever, and should not strongly impact the representativeness of our SGP sample. All subjects
were contacted by and recruited through a professional polling institute during the summer of
2016 (ResearchNow, now known as Dynata, www.dynata.com), and were reimbursed for their
participation. The polling institute is licensed to operate in the US and SGP, and followed all
applicable local regulations. All participants first opted in to be included in a list of potential
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participants for ResearchNow, and then again gave their written informed consent to partici-
pate in this specific study. ResearchNow was unaware of the purpose of the current investiga-
tion, and ensured all participants remained anonymous. No personally identifiable data was
ever given to the researchers. This study was approved by the ethical committee of the Depart-
ment of Psychology, Humboldt University, Berlin, and was conducted in accordance with the
Helsinki declaration.
Please note that we decided to acquire data in two cultures in order to better test the gener-
alizability of our results. For this purpose, the two cultures need to differ significantly along at
least one dimension. Here, we focus on two countries that differ mainly in their individualism
scores (US = highly individualistic, SGP = highly collectivistic, [30]). Unfortunately, we were
unable to directly measure individualism in our samples due to time constraints. However, it
seems highly unlikely that the US and SGP samples are equal in their individualism scores in
our study, given our large samples and previous work demonstrating that these two countries
lie at both extremes of the individualism spectrum [31]. Any potential cultural differences are
likely to be driven at least in part by differences in individualism, but given the fact that these
two cultures also differ along other dimensions, cultural differences should be interpreted with
care. In order to address at least some of the potential alternative explanations, we controlled
for differences in demographic variables (age, sex, education, see below).
Measures
All measures were administered in their English version to all subjects, in order to maximize
comparability between the different samples.
Free will beliefs. Free will beliefs were measured using the Free Will Inventory [1], which
was developed to measure beliefs about free will and related concepts. The FWI (part 1) cap-
tures FWB along three dimensions: free will (FW-general), determinism (FW-de), and dual-
ism (FW-du). Each sub-scale was measured using 5 items, with a total of 15 items. Responses
were based on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree), the mid-point of the scale was 4 (neither agree nor disagree). For illustration purposes,
we rescaled all items to fall in between -1 (strongly disagree) and +1 (strongly agree). Thus,
positive values indicate agreement, while negative values indicate disagreement (0 indicated
Table 1. Sample characteristics in the USA and Singapore.
US SGP
Target Empirical data Target Empirical data
Age RF RF N RF RF N
18–24 13% 13% 117 15% 15.5% 140
25–34 22% 22% 198 22% 22.5% 203
35–44 22% 22% 198 25% 25.6% 231
45–54 24% 24% 216 24% 24.7% 223
55–64 19% 19% 171 15% 11.4% 103
Sex
male 49% 49% 441 50% 50% 450
female 51% 51% 459 50% 50% 450
total 100% 900 100% 900
Shown are the target age (by age group) and sex distributions (Target), as well as the actual distributions in both samples (Empirical data), RF = relative frequency,
N = absolute number, US = United States, SGP = Singapore.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221617.t001
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neither agreement nor disagreement). The reliability of the subscales (as computed using the
psych package in R) was acceptable in the USA and SGP (Table 2). In order to test whether the
FWI gives a similar factor structure in both samples, and to replicate [1], we performed addi-
tional validation analyses (see S2 Analysis). We also administered the second part of the FWI,
which measures subjects’ agreement to compatibilist views on free will, as well as their intui-
tions on punishment and responsibility. The FWI has no reverse-coded items, and is thus vul-
nerable to acquiescence bias. To rule out such biases, we performed an additional control
analysis. Using data from a different questionnaire in the same sample (self-efficacy, see
below), which contains reverse-coded items, we showed that subjects did not demonstrate
acquiescence bias (see S3 Analysis).
Demographic variables. We recorded the following demographic variables: age, sex
(male, female), highest level of education (pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper sec-
ondary, post-secondary non-tertiary, short-cycle tertiary, bachelors, masters, doctors, no
answer), total years of education, and profession (open responses).
Other measures. We also acquired data from other measures, including locus of control
(results reported in S1 Analysis), self-efficacy, neuroticism, self-esteem, current bodily state.
The focus of this investigation is the description of FWB and their relation to determinism and
dualism, and results from these additional measures are thus not reported here.
Procedure
After being invited to participate, subjects received a link to the online questionnaires. Subjects
completed all questionnaires online in the browser, as implemented in the Unipark software
(QuestBack GmbH, Ko¨ln, Germany). First, they gave their written informed consent to partic-
ipate in the study. Instructions were then presented on screen, explaining how to indicate
responses to each item. The study always started with acquiring demographic data. After this
part was completed, subjects were presented with the questionnaires, in a randomized order to
avoid sequence effects. Subjects were given no time constraints for responding to the items.
Analyses
All analyses were performed in R (RStudio, Version 1.1.456, RRID:SCR_000432).
Replication procedure. Replications remain a rarity in psychological research on free will
[26,32], but crucially, all statistical inferences reported here were replicated within two inde-
pendent samples. We first randomly split the US sample in half (n = 450 for each sub-sample),
with the constraint that both sub-samples remain representative of sex and age, just as the orig-
inal sample was. The first half was called main sample, the second replication sample. The same
procedure was performed in the SGP sample. All inference statistics were performed on both
Table 2. Reliability of the FWI.
US SGP
alpha 95% CI alpha 95% CI
FWI
free will 0.81 0.79–0.83 0.79 0.77–0.81
determinism 0.85 0.84–0.87 0.81 0.79–0.83
dualism 0.82 0.80–0.84 0.78 0.76–0.80
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for all sub-scales reported. Includes 95% confidence intervals (CI). FWI = free will
inventory, US = United States, SGP = Singapore.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221617.t002
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independent samples. In this report, we only present results that were confirmed in both the
main and in the independent replication sample.
Descriptive statistics. In order to first describe the results in both cultures, we counted
how many subjects believed, disbelieved, or were indifferent towards free will (FW-gen), deter-
minism (FW-de), and dualism (FW-du). For this purpose, we averaged item responses sepa-
rately for each of the three FWI sub-scales, and then assessed the proportion of subjects
scoring positively (belief), negatively (disbelief), or zero (indifference). This was done sepa-
rately for both cultures and all 3 sub-scales. Given the wording of the items, and especially the
rating scale labels used (strongly agree, neither agree not disagree, strongly disagree), we
believe responses can be interpreted meaningfully in the way described here.
Analysis 1: Libertarianism. In order to assess whether libertarianism provided a good
explanation for free will beliefs [14], we performed three different analyses. First, part 2 of the
FWI contains items that explicitly assess agreement to central tenets of libertarian, incompati-
bilist theories of free will. One item assesses the ‘ability to do otherwise’ (item 1: ‘Free will is
the ability to make different choices even if everything leading up to one’s choice (e.g., the
past, the situation, and their desires, beliefs, etc.) were exactly the same.’), a central component
of incompatibilist definitions of free will. Another item assesses the notion of the unmoved
mover (item 6: ‘To have free will is to be able to cause things to happen in the world without at
the same time being caused to make those things happen.’). Many libertarians would agree to
both claims, and we thus assessed how many participants agreed to these items separately in
the US, and SGP. Responses to these items by themselves are agnostic as to whether partici-
pants actually believe in free will and/or determinism or not. They merely ask whether partici-
pants agree with key concepts and definitions of (some) libertarian, incompatibilist views.
Results from these items thus need to be seen in context with the actual data from the general
free will sub-scale. By e.g. showing a positive correlation with FW-gen, we can show that a
strong belief in free will co-occurs with an acceptance of incompatibilist definitions of free
will. This in turn would be more direct evidence for libertarian intuitions of free will than e.g.
only showing agreement with the libertarian intuitions. In order to test the relationship of
these two items and the FW-gen sub-scale, we used a linear model approach. We estimated
two simple Bayesian linear models (using lmBF from the BayesFactor package), one for each
item, entering FW-gen as the dependent, and responses to the above mentioned items as the
independent variable (e.g. FW-gen ~ FWI part2 item1). Please note, that we refrained from
combining both items into a ‘libertarianism’ index through e.g. averaging responses because
items of FWI part2 showed insufficient psychometric properties to construct a e.g. ‘libertarian-
ism’ sub-scale [1]. We thus analysed all FWI part2 items independently. We assessed whether
the models explained FW-gen by computing the Bayes Factor (BF10), which indicates whether
effects are present, absent, or whether the data is inconclusive [33]. We considered BF10s from
0.3 to 1 as anecdotal evidence for the absence of an effect. BF10s from 0.1 to 0.3 were consid-
ered moderate, while BF10s< 0.1 were considered strong evidence for the absence of an effect.
BF10s from 1 to 3 were considered anecdotal, from 3 to 10 as moderate, and above 10 as strong
evidence for the presence of an effect, respectively. Although frequentist hypothesis testing
does not allow us to test evidence in favor of H0, we report their results for the interested
reader (using lm). Our conclusions are solely based on the Bayesian models however.
Explicitly agreeing to an incompatibilist definition of free will, which underlies libertarian
theories, does not automatically mean that one acts consistently with this belief. In a second
analysis, we therefore assessed whether participants responded to part 1 of the FWI in a way
that is consistent with libertarian positions. If a large portion of participants indeed agreed
with an incompatibilist definition of free will, one might expect them to only believe in free
will but not in determinism. In order to test this prediction, we assessed the relation of FW-
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gen and FW-de, separately for US and SGP, again using a similar Bayesian linear model
approach (FW-gen ~ FW-de), and expected a negative relationship. The more subjects
believed in free will, the less they should believe in determinism. Again, we base our conclu-
sions on the estimated BF10, but report frequentist statistics for the interested reader as well.
Third, the relationship of FW-gen and FW-de can be assessed by comparing data across
both countries. Libertarianism predicts that if we see cultural differences on the FW-gen scale
(e.g. US> SGP, as we expected based on previous findings [2,28,29]), we should observe dif-
ferences in the opposite direction on the FW-de scale (e.g. SGP >US). This was tested using
Bayesian two-sample t-tests (using ttestBF from the BayesFactor package), which output BF10s.
These were interpreted as described above. We again report frequentist tests for the interested
reader, but base our conclusions on BF10s.
Analysis 2: Compatibilism. In order to assess whether compatibilist intuitions explain
free will beliefs [12], we used a similar analysis approach as in Analysis 1. First, we assessed
two items of part2 of the FWI that probe agreement to two central claims of compatibilist theo-
ries of free will. Item 2 assessed the notion that free will means choosing according to one’s
beliefs and desires (‘Free will is the ability to make a choice based on one’s beliefs and desires
such that, if one had different beliefs or desires, one’s choice would have been different as
well.’). Item 7 assessed the notion that free will means not being coerced by other people (‘Peo-
ple have free will as long as they are able to do what they want without being coerced or con-
strained by other people.’). Again, we first counted the number of subjects agreeing to these
statements. Given that these items are again agnostic as to whether subjects actually believe in
free will, we again assessed whether responses to these items were related to FW-gen scores
using a linear model approach (e.g. FW-gen ~ FWI part2 item2). If FW-gen is linked to com-
patibilist theories of free will, we expect to see a positive relationship. Similar to Analysis 1, we
can make predictions about responses to part 1 of the FWI if a majority of participants agreed
with compatibilist definitions of free will. In this case we would expect either no or a positive
correlation between FW-gen and FW-de, as subjects can (but do not have to) believe in free
will and determinism at the same time. This was tested using the same linear model approach
as in Analysis 1 (FW-gen ~ FW-de). Please note that the FW-de sub-scale does not differenti-
ate between different sources of dis/belief in determinism (e.g. fatalistic vs scientific determin-
ism, [20]), but it still allowed us to distinguish between libertarian and compatibilistic theories
of free will, a comparison that has not been made explicit in most previous research.
Analysis 3: Dualism. In order to assess whether free will beliefs are related to dualistic
intuitions [15], we again followed the same analysis approach as before. We first assessed
agreement to an item in part2 of the FWI, which assessed the necessity of an immaterial soul
for free will (item 5: ‘If it turned out that people lacked non-physical (or immaterial) souls,
then they would lack free will.’). We then computed linear models to assess whether responses
to this item were positively related to FW-gen (FW-gen ~ FWI part2 item5). If a majority of
the subjects believed an immaterial soul to be a necessary condition for free will, we would fur-
ther expect a positive relationship between FW-gen and FW-du, which we tested using a linear
model approach again (FW-gen ~ FW-du). The FW-du subscale covers two aspects of dualism
beliefs, substance dualism and non-reductivism, and both potentially contribute to observed
results. As before, all these analyses were performed separately for the US and SGP.
Analysis 4: Comparing different intuitions. Lay theories on philosophical issues rarely
are logically consistent [34], which is one reason why we assessed both the explicit agreement
to central claims of libertarian, compatibilist, and dualist theories, and whether behavior was
consistent with their predictions. However, it is likely that more than one explanation for free
will beliefs might be seen in the general public. This is especially true in this study, as we
assessed large representative samples in two different cultures. In order to assess whether
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libertarianism, compatibilism, or dualism offered the best explanation for free will beliefs, we
performed an additional analysis.
In a first step, we tested which definition of free will (as assessed using the five FWI part2
items analyzed above: FWI2i1, FWI2i2, FWI2i5, FWI2i6, FWI2i7) showed the strongest rela-
tionship to FW-gen. For this purpose, we computed multiple linear models in the US sample,
using the five FWI part2 items. We calculated a model fit (using the AIC, [35]) for each possi-
ble combination of variables, and then used a step-wise model selection procedure (using ste-
pAIC from the MASS package) to determine the best-fitting model. This was done on both the
main and the replication sample, and we only report effects that were consistently found in
both independent samples. We then performed post-hoc tests (using linearHypothesis from
the car package), using Bonferroni correction to account for multiple testing, in order to deter-
mine which FWI part2 item explained FW-gen the best. The same procedure was then per-
formed on data from the SGP sample.
Similar to Analyses 1–3, we then also assessed behavior in part1 of the FWI directly. If we
were to e.g. find that incompatibilist definitions of free will were most strongly related to FW-
gen, we would expect FW-gen to be most strongly related to FW-de, and less so to FW-du. We
therefore repeated the same model fitting and selection procedure as above, only now entering
FW-de, FW-du, and their interaction as explanatory variables. We first determined the best-
fitting model using the AIC as a criterion, and then performed post-hoc tests to determine
which variable best explained FW-gen. All models in Analysis 4 were additionally estimated
using a Bayesian framework (see S4 Analysis), in order to assess robustness of the results.
Overall, these analyses identify statistical relationships between FW-gen and other FWI sub-
scales. They demonstrate that e.g. FW-de is predictive of FW-gen, they do not demonstrate
strict causal relationships.
Results
Descriptive statistics
First, we assessed the percentage of subjects believing in free will, determinism, and dualism
(Fig 1). The FWI allows us to count how many subjects agree with beliefs according to its three
dimensions. In the US, the majority did believe in free will (82.33%), and only a minority
believed in determinism (30.77%). A vast majority of subjects also believed in dualism
(75.77%). In SGP, the majority also believed in free will (85.44%), just like in the US. Interest-
ingly, belief in determinism showed the opposite pattern in SGP as in the US, with the majority
believing in it in SGP (59.00%). Dualism beliefs were even stronger than in the US, with a large
majority believing in it (88.33%). This shows that across both cultures the majority largely
agreed in their beliefs in free will and dualism, but had diverging views on determinism. We
further assessed whether demographic variables (sex, age, education) affected any of the FWI
sub-scale scores and found no effect on any sub-scale either in the US, or SGP (see S5
Analysis).
Analysis 1: Libertarianism
As stated above, one major intuition that might be closely related to free will beliefs is libertari-
anism, the belief that we have free will because the physical world is not fully determined [14].
Agreement to central tenets of libertarian, incompatibilist theories is assessed in two items of
part2 of the FWI (‘ability to do otherwise’, ‘unmoved mover’), and we first assessed agreement
to these statements in the US and SGP. Most participants agreed with item 1 (‘ability to do oth-
erwise’), in the US (76.6%), and in SGP (83.2%). We then tested whether agreement to this
statement is related to FW-gen. We found it to be related positively in both the US, b = 0.10,
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R2 = 0.15, F(1,447) = 81.91, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150, and SGP, b = 0.11, R
2 = 0.16, F(1,449) =
88.70, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150. Most participants also agreed to the ‘unmoved mover’ item, in
the US (62%), and in SGP (70.6%). Again responses on this item were positively related to
FW-gen in the US, b = 0.06, R2 = 0.05, F(1,449) = 27.24, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150, and SGP,
b = 0.09, R2 = 0.13, F(1,449) = 66.60, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150, although the effect was slightly
weaker than for item 1.
Based on these responses, one might expect that participants hold a libertarian view on free
will, which suggest incompatibilism, i.e. the notion that free will cannot exist in a deterministic
world. If participants held this view, this should be reflected in a negative relation of the FW-
gen and FW-de scales. Counter to the prediction of a libertarian position, we found FW-gen
and FW-de to be related positively in both the US, b = 0.12, R2 = 0.02, F(1,447) = 11.97,
p< 0.001, BF10 = 32, and SGP, b = 0.37, R
2 = 0.18, F(1,449) = 101.95, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150
(Fig 2), although the effect in the US was relatively small. This positive relation is more in line
with compatibilist views on free will than with libertarian views (see Analysis 2).
The relation between FW-gen and FW-de can further be assessed through a cross-cultural
comparison. If general free will beliefs were closely related to determinism beliefs, we should
see a covariation of FW-gen and FW-de scores across cultures. We see a clear difference in
FW-de, t(857) = -9.58, p< 0.001, d = 0.63, BF10 > 150, with US disbelieving in determinism
and SGP believing in it (Fig 1). According to a libertarian view, we should observe the opposite
effect for FW-gen, i.e. lower FW-gen scores in SGP than in the US. Yet, we found strong evi-
dence for the absence of cultural differences in FW-gen, t(887) = -0.48, p = 0.63, d = 0.03,
BF10 = 0.08. An additional control analysis demonstrated that these effects cannot be explained
by mere differences in average age, sex-ratio, or level of educational between countries (see S6
Analysis). Thus, differences in determinism beliefs across cultures occur in the absence of any
differences in general free will beliefs, again demonstrating that FW-gen and FW-de are not
negatively related. Overall, this points to some inconsistencies in lay beliefs, as most partici-
pants agree to libertarian concepts of free will, yet still free will and determinism are positively
related.
Analysis 2: Compatibilism
Our previous analysis highlighted some of the inconsistencies linked to libertarianism as an
explanation for pervasive general free will beliefs. An alternative explanation can be found in
compatibilism, i.e. the view that free will and determinism are compatible and that one can
believe in both at the same time. Again, we first assessed agreement to central concepts of com-
patibilist positions (‘choose according to beliefs/desires’, ‘no coercion’). Most participants
agreed that free will means choosing according to one’s own beliefs and desires, US (57%),
SGP (64%). However, these responses were only weakly related to FW-gen in SGP, b = 0.06, R2
= 0.06, F(1,449) = 28.08, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150, and unrelated in the US, b = 0.02, R
2 = 0.008,
F(1,447) = 3.85, p = 0.05, BF10 = 0.67. The ‘no coercion’ item showed somewhat different
responses. In the US, participants mostly disagreed (37.2%) or were indifferent (36.5%), and in
SGP participants mostly believed (49.3%) or were indifferent (36.7%). As before, responses
were only weakly related to FW-gen in SGP, b = 0.07, R2 = 0.10, F(1,449) = 48.72, p< 0.001,
Fig 1. Free will beliefs. Violin / box plots depicting the distribution of general free will beliefs (FW-gen, above),
determinism beliefs (FW-de, middle), and dualism beliefs (FW-du, below) in the United States (US, left/light grey) and
Singapore (SGP, right/dark grey). Scores larger than 0 indicate a belief in e.g. determinism, while scores smaller than 0
indicate a disbelief in e.g. determinism. Scores of 0 indicate indifference.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221617.g001
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BF10 > 150, and unrelated in the US, b = 0.005, R
2 = 0.0007, F(1,447) = 0.31, p = 0.57, BF10 =
0.12.
These results show that agreement with compatibilist concepts of free will is higher in SGP,
and participants in the US disagree with some central compatibilist claims. Based on this, we
would expect subjects (especially in SGP) to show either no or a positive relation between FW-
gen and FW-de, as compatibilists might (but do not have to) believe simultaneously in free
will and determinism. In fact, we found FW-gen and FW-de to be related positively both in
the US (b = 0.12, see Analysis 1), and in SGP (b = 0.37, Fig 2). Results in SGP show some con-
sistency, in that the overall agreement to compatibilist concepts of free will was in line with
their response patterns on part 1 of the FWI. Results in the US were less consistent however, as
subjects only strongly agreed to libertarian concepts of free will, yet their response patterns on
part 1 of the FWI were more in line with compatibilist theories.
Analysis 3: Dualism
In the previous analyses, we focused on the relationship of FW-gen to FW-de and compatibi-
lism. An alternative explanation might be that subjects believe in dualism, i.e. that the mind or
soul is not a physical entity. This often entails that it is exempt from the deterministic laws that
govern the physical world. One item of part 2 of the FWI explicitly assesses whether an imma-
terial soul is necessary for free will, and most participants agree that it is, US (77.1%), SGP
(82,8%). Responses to this item were further positively related to FW-gen in the US, b = 0.06,
R2 = 0.07, F(1,447) = 35.94, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150, and SGP, b = 0.10, R
2 = 0.14, F(1,449) =
74.85, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150. Based on this result, one would further expect FW-gen and FW-
du to be positively related. Indeed, we found a strong positive relationship in the US, b = 0.28,
R2 = 0.10, F(1,447) = 54.60, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150, and in SGP, b = 0.53, R
2 = 0.26, F(1,449) =
165.10, p< 0.001, BF10 > 150, where dualism alone explained about a quarter of the variance
Fig 2. FWI sub-scale correlations. On the left, correlations between general free will beliefs and determinism are
depicted, for the United States (US, n = 900, above) and Singapore (SGP, n = 900, below). On the right the relation
between general free will beliefs and dualism is depicted. Each dot represents a single subject. Positive values represent
belief in e.g. free will, negative values represent disbelief. For illustration purposes, the single subject data was slightly
jittered to better depict its density. Black lines are fitted linear models, which are drawn with a 90% confidence interval
(dark gray area) and the corresponding b value.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221617.g002
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of FW-gen. This shows that people see dualism as a necessary condition for free will, and
respond to part 1 of the FWI in a way that is consistent with this belief. As an additional
exploratory analysis, we also assessed the relation of FW-de and FW-du (S7 Analysis).
Analysis 4: Comparing different intuitions
Given that psychological lay theories rarely are logically consistent [34], it is not entirely unex-
pected that our data provides evidence for multiple explanations. Yet, in order to systemati-
cally assess which theory provides a better prediction of general free will beliefs, we computed
multiple different linear models and compared their fit to our data-set. First, we assessed
which of the FWI part 2 items best explained FW-gen in the US. We found items 1 (‘ability to
do otherwise’), 5 (‘necessity of immaterial soul’), & 6 (‘unmoved mover’) to be positively
related to FW-gen, F(3,447) = 30.43, p< 0.001, R2 = 0.17, bitem1 = 0.99, t(447) = 5.21,
p< 0.001, bitem5 = 0.59, t(447) = 3.05, p = 0.002, bitem6 = 0.71, t(447) = 4.13, p< 0.001. Post-
hoc tests revealed no significant differences between the three main effects, all Fs(1,447)<
1.70, ps> 0.19. Second, we assessed whether FW-de or FW-du is more strongly related to
FW-gen. The winning model included both main effects and their interaction, F(3,447) = 30.6,
p< 0.001, R2 = 0.16. We found only FW-du to be related to FW-gen, bFW-du = 0.32, t(448) =
7.73, p< 0.001, but not FW-de, bFW-de = 0.06, t(448) = 1.49, p = 0.13. Post-hoc tests revealed
that FW-du is also more strongly related to FW-gen than FW-de is, F(1,448) = 19.48,
p< 0.001. We further found a significant interaction, bint = 0.03, t(447) = 4.46, p< 0.001.
While determinism reduced FW-gen in subjects that believed the least in dualism, determin-
ism increased FW-gen in subjects that believed the most in dualism (Fig 3). These results show
that both libertarian and dualistic concepts are related to general FWB in the US, but that the
link to dualism is stronger than the link to determinism.
In SGP, we found FWI part 2 items 1 (‘ability to do otherwise’), 5 (‘necessity of immaterial
soul’), and 7 (‘no coercion’) to be related to FW-gen, F(3,445) = 58.00, p< 0.001, R2 = 0.28,
bitem1 = 1.25, t(445) = 7.16, p<0.001, bitem5 = 0.85, t(445) = 4.96, p< 0.001, bitem7 = 0.68, t
(445) = 5.21, p< 0.001. Post-hoc testes revealed that of these items, only item 1 was found to
be more strongly related to FW-gen than item 7, F(1,445) = 6.10, p = 0.01, while no difference
was found between items 1 and 7, and items 5 and 7, all Fs (1,445) > 1.79, ps> 0.18. We also
assessed the relation of FW-de and FW-du to FW-gen in the SGP sample. The winning model
included both main effects, as well as their interaction, F(3,447) = 82.49, p< 0.001, R2 = 0.35.
We found both a main effect of FW-de, bFWI-det = 0.25, t(448) = 7.09, p< 0.001, and FW-du,
bFWI-du = 0.43, t(448) = 10.36, p< 0.001, as well as a significant interaction, bint = 0.02, t(447) =
3.08, p = 0.002. Overall, determinism facilitated the positive effect of dualism on general free
will beliefs, with this facilitation being stronger for subjects that believed relatively less in dual-
ism than for subjects that believed relatively more in dualism (Fig 3). Post-hoc tests revealed
that the effect of FW-du was significantly stronger than the effect of FW-de, F(1,448) = 8.11,
p = 0.004. These results show that libertarian, compatibilist, and dualistic concepts are positively
related to general free will beliefs, and that the link to dualism beliefs is stronger than the link to
determinism beliefs. We also conducted a Bayesian version of Analysis 4 (S4 Analysis), which
confirmed the results reported here.
Given that more than one intuition seems to predict free will beliefs, and that these views
are not seen as mutually exclusive, we counted the number of compatibilist subjects that also
believed dualism to be necessary for free will. We found a large majority to believe in both con-
cepts in the US (86.00%) and SGP (89.56%). Additionally, most subjects believing in a libertar-
ian version of free will also believed dualism to be necessary for free will (US 83.61%, SGP
91.32%). Paradoxically, we even found a majority of subjects that believed in a compatibilist
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definition of free will to also believe in an incompatibilist definition of free will (US 86.19%,
SGP 92.29%), despite inherent logical inconsistencies of holding both beliefs simultaneously.
Yet, despite this fact we also demonstrated that dualism was the single best predictor for gen-
eral free will beliefs in both the US and SGP.
Discussion
Here, we report results from a large, representative, cross-cultural online survey study examin-
ing free will beliefs in an individualistic western (US) and a collectivistic east Asian (SGP) cul-
ture [30]. First, we largely validated previous findings in larger, more representative samples
[1], which is not at all common in psychology [32]. We also assessed our results using a novel
analysis approach, investigating which of three prominent intuitions is most closely related to
Fig 3. Effects of dualism and determinism on general free will beliefs. The effects of dualism and determinism on
general free will beliefs are depicted for the US (above) and SGP (below). For visualization purposes, we performed a
median split along both the dualism and determinism dimensions, showing data separately for high dualism beliefs
(left), low dualism beliefs (right), high determinism beliefs (light gray), and low determinism beliefs (dark grey).
Positive values indicate belief in free will, zero indicates indifference. Error bars represent SEM.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221617.g003
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free will beliefs empirically: libertarianism, compatibilism, and dualism. Past research did not
directly assess and compare these different theories, rather focusing on e.g. different sources of
determinism beliefs [20]. Free will was at least partly explained by libertarian, compatibilist,
and dualist theories, showing that more than one theory is prevalent in the general public.
Contrary to our initial hypothesis, the link to dualist theories was the strongest and most con-
sistent in our data-set.
Free will and determinism
Whether we have free will or not has been debated amongst scholars for centuries, yet lay-
people’s intuitions on this issue have only been studied fairly recently [23,36]. It has been
pointed out that lay intuitions on free will are often conflicting [23], as we generally feel as if
we have a free choice between multiple alternatives (free will), yet we also feel that every-
thing that is happening should have a causal explanation (determinism). For many scholars,
these intuitions are incompatible, motivating incompatibilist theories on free will, such as
libertarianism [14], according to which we are free because our world is not deterministic,
or hard determinism, according to which we have no free will because we are determined.
Crucially, it remained unclear whether similar intuitions are prevalent in the general public
as well. Our results highlight some inconsistencies of lay beliefs in the general public, by
showing explicit agreement with libertarian concepts of free will (especially in the US) and
simultaneously showing behavior that is more consistent with compatibilist theories. If par-
ticipants behaved in a way that was consistent with their libertarian beliefs, we would have
expected a negative relation between free will and determinism, but instead we saw a posi-
tive relation that is hard to reconcile with libertarian views (see also [3,18] for converging
evidence) as well as hard determinist views (see S8 Analysis). This shows a disconnection
between belief in explicit concepts regarding free will, and the resulting behavior, and future
research should measure both independently.
Regarding determinism beliefs by themselves, previous work suggests that belief in deter-
minism is relatively weak in the general public [23], but our data only partly support this
notion. While most people in the US indeed did not believe in determinism, the opposite was
true in Singapore, which underscores the need to study FWB in a variety of different cultures
to avoid sampling biases [24]. One tentative explanation for this difference might be that the
US are a highly individualistic country, while SGP is a more collectivistic country [30], and US
citizens might be more strongly opposed to their behavior being determined by forces outside
their direct control (see also [37] and S1 Analysis for a comparison of Locus of Control
between countries). Although we have shown that this effect cannot be attributed to differ-
ences in age, sex, or education, the present data alone cannot conclusively attribute this effect
to individualism alone. While individualism might be one of the most prominent differences
between the US and SGP, both countries also differ along many other dimensions, which
might potentially also explain this effect. Clearly, future work will have to address the link
between individualism and free will beliefs more directly (see also [38]). Regarding intuitions
on free will, belief in free will was pervasive in both cultures (see also [39]), and was correlated
positively with determinism. Surprisingly, we found no difference in general free will beliefs
across both countries, despite the high statistical power of our design. This shows the robust-
ness of general free will beliefs despite the many differences between these two cultures. Over-
all, our results suggest that a large part of the general public has libertarian and compatibilist
(SGP), or only libertarian (US) intuitions on free will, but behave in a way that is more in line
with compatibilist intuitions irrespective whether they are from the US or SGP.
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Free will and dualism
Although dualistic beliefs are known to be pervasive (see [40–42] for previous evidence form
smaller, more restricted samples), we were surprised by the degree to which both the general
public in the US as well as SGP believed in mind-body dualism. The vast majority (more than
3 out of 4 participants) believes that the mind or soul is a non-physical entity, or at least that
the mind cannot be reduced to the brain (see [20] for a discussion about different aspects of
dualism beliefs). A similar proportion of subjects views an immaterial soul as a necessary con-
dition for free will. Some previous work already demonstrated a high prevalence of dualism
beliefs in a US sample [1], yet also demonstrated considerable inter-individual differences in
dualism beliefs [43]. Here, we rather show that dualism beliefs are highly prevalent across dif-
ferent cultures, all age groups, both sexes, as well as different levels of education. Dualistic
explanations of free will are not prominent in the current academic debate [44,45], but are
strong in the general public. Previous empirical evidence in this issue was mixed. While some
showed that dualism and FWB are independent [16,46], others found a relation of FWB and at
least some aspects of dualism beliefs [20]. Our results demonstrate that, contrary to our initial
hypotheses, free will beliefs are best predicted, and most closely related to dualism beliefs, and
that this relation is stronger and more consistent than to compatibilist or libertarian intuitions.
Dualism alone explained about a quarter of the FW-gen variance in SGP. One possible reason
for this strong link might be religious convictions [43]. In the US, 95% believe in a life after
death, which at least implicitly implies dualism [47], but see [48]. Clearly, future research will
have to be directed at explaining why dualism is so highly prevalent in these countries and
how exactly it is related to free will beliefs. Specifically, it will be highly interesting to differenti-
ate between different aspects of dualism beliefs (see [20]) and assess such effects in representa-
tive cross-cultural samples as well. It will also be interesting to experimentally manipulate
dualism beliefs and assess potential effects on FWB.
Despite the fact that dualism was most strongly related to general free will beliefs, the latter
were at least partly explained by libertarian and compatibilist beliefs as well. Evidently, these
theories are not mutually exclusive in the eyes of the general public [23]. It is possible that sub-
jects believed in compatibilism and/or libertarianism because they view the mind as a non-
physical entity. In line with this, we showed that the vast majority of compatibilists and liber-
tarians were also dualist. Additionally, we found an interaction between determinism and
dualism effects on general free will beliefs. In the US, determinism effects on FWB reverse
depending on the level of dualism beliefs, and in SGP this effect is at least moderated in
strength. Although the directionality of this effect will need to be tested more directly in future
research, at the very least this is evidence for the complicated interaction of determinism and
dualism beliefs and possible moderating effects of dualism beliefs. Yet, this key finding is
somewhat at odds with the current philosophical debate surrounding free will, which focuses
largely on its relation to determinism (e.g. [49]). Some argue for compatibilism [14], others for
libertarianism [12] or hard determinism [10], but all of these theories try to explain how free
will is related to determinism. Our results suggest that dualism is much more important to lay
theories than it is for academic theories of free will, and determinism might not pose a threat
to free will because of wide-spread dualistic beliefs (see also [50]).
These findings have further implications for studies trying to experimentally manipulate
FWB [4,51,52]. In a typical experiment, participant might read a text that suggests we have no
free will [52], which often also suggests materialism (e.g. only physical matter exists, and men-
tal states are by-products of physical processes). Although it is possible that this manipulation
directly reduces belief in free will, our results suggest a possible alternative explanation. Poten-
tially, such manipulations reduce the belief in dualism instead, which is generally seen as a
Free will beliefs, determinism, and dualism across cultures
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221617 September 11, 2019 15 / 19
necessary condition for free will (see Analysis 3). In this case, such a manipulation might lead
to a reduction in free will beliefs, but crucially moderated by dualism beliefs. Future experi-
mental research should investigate which specific beliefs are directly affected by FWB
manipulations.
Conclusion
We have shown that free will beliefs in the general public are most closely related to a strong
belief in dualism. This was true in different cultures, age groups, and levels of education. As
noted in the beginning, recent neuroscientific findings have been taken to suggest that our
choices might originate from unconscious brain activity [8,9], but see [53], which has led some
to predict an erosion of free will beliefs with potentially serious consequences for our sense of
responsibility and even the criminal justice system [7]. However, even if neuroscience were to
fully describe and explain the causal chain of processes in the physical brain, this need not lead
to an erosion of free will beliefs in the general public. Although some might indeed see this as a
threat to free will (US citizens with low dualism beliefs), most will not likely because of a wide-
spread belief in dualism (see also [21]). Our findings also highlight the need for cross-cultural
examinations of free will beliefs and related constructs, as previous findings from (mostly
undergraduate) US samples do not fully generalize to other cultures.
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